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II. STATEMENT OF THE CASE
A.

Nature of the Case
This is an appeal from the district court’s judgment dismissing Appellant Miguel Zavala’s

petition for post-conviction relief.
B.

General Course of Proceedings
Following preliminary hearing, the state charged Mr. Zavala with attempted first degree

murder in a sole count Information. R. 102-03. Specifically, the state alleged that on January 6,
2015, Mr. Zavala “willfully, unlawfully, deliberately with premeditation, and with malice
aforethought attempt[ed] to kill and murder” Carlos Zaragoza “by attempting to run [him] over
with an automobile and/or by attempting to stab or slice him with a knife.” Id.
At trial, the district court instructed the jury that if it acquitted Mr. Zavala of attempted
murder, it must consider whether he: (1) “used force or violence” on the victim intending “that
there be a forceful or violent contact”; (2) actually, intentionally, and unlawfully touched or
struck Mr. Zaragoza; or (3) unlawfully and intentionally caused bodily harm to another person.
R. 126-128. If the jury concluded Mr. Zavala committed battery by one of the foregoing means
and that Mr. Zaragoza “suffered great bodily harm permanent disfigurement or permanent
disability,” the district court instructed it must find Mr. Zavala guilty of aggravated battery. Id.
The jury acquitted Mr. Zavala of attempted murder and convicted him of aggravated
battery. R. 144. The district court sentenced Mr. Zavala to a unified term of five years, all
indeterminate. R. 92. Mr. Zavala appealed and appellate counsel argued only that the district
court abused its discretion by imposing his sentence rather than placing him on probation. State
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v. Zavala, Idaho Supreme Court Docket No. 43906 (Nov. 9, 2016, Court of Appeals)
(unpublished). The Court of Appeals affirmed. Id.
On December 12, 2016, Mr. Zavala filed a hand-written and pro se petition for postconviction relief a supporting affidavit. R. 7-18, 44-47. Mr. Zavala cited State v. Sherrod, 131
Idaho 56, 951 P.2d 1283 (Ct. App. 1998), which held that allowing the jury to find “great bodily
harm” based on injuries other than stab wounds alleged in the amended information violated due
process by allowing the jury to convict the defendant of an offense different from that with
which he was charged. Mr. Zavala alleged he was not charged with aggravated battery and
because aggravated battery was not a lesser included offense of the first-degree murder charge,
the jury convicted him of an offense other than which he was charged. R. 12-13. Mr. Zavala cited
State v. Flegel, 151 Idaho 525, 261 P.3d 519 (2011), which held the district court was without
subject matter jurisdiction over an offense that had not been presented to the grand jury, and
argued the district court did not have subject matter jurisdiction over the aggravated battery
charge. R. 13.
Mr. Zavala also argued that he received ineffective assistance of counsel because counsel
failed to object to the aggravated battery instruction, failed to sufficiently impeach the victim,
and failed to call certain key witnesses. R. 12-18. Mr. Zavala further alleged counsel failed to
present evidence of the victim’s character under I.R.E. 404(b)(2), including acts of violence and
gang activity, to establish that the victim was the first aggressor and to rebut the prosecutor’s
argument that the victim was a good person. R. 15-18. Mr. Zavala alleged he was prejudiced
because he did not commit a crime and only protected his girlfriend and her property.
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Mr. Zavala also alleged the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by knowingly presenting
false evidence and making false statements in a motion in limine filed September 23, 2015. R.
12-18, 93. Mr. Zavala attached a police report, medical records and other documents regarding
an incident in which Mr. Zarazoga (the victim in this case) stabbed someone and caused property
damage in April 2015—four months after the incident at issue here. Mr. Zavala alleged that the
prosecutor did not charge Mr. Zarazoga with aggravated battery for the April incident in order to
prevent Mr. Zavala from being able to present evidence of that incident to establish Mr.
Zarazoga’s violent character. R. 7-32.
On December 16, 2016, the state answered Mr. Zavala’s petition generally denying the
allegations and claiming Mr. Zavala’s petition was subject to dismissal because he failed to
provide “appropriate affidavits, trial transcripts, records and other evidence” as required by I.C.
§19-4903. R. 49-51. The state further alleged that the petition should be dismissed because the
“pleadings and record” in the post-conviction case and the underlying criminal case were
“sufficient to allow the court” to decide “no purpose would be served by post conviction relief
proceedings” under I.C. §19- 4906(c). R. 51.
On December 22, 2016, the district court appointed counsel. R. 54-55. On February 3,
2017, post-conviction counsel sought additional time to amend the petition, which the district
court granted. R. 56-58. On March 28, 2017, Mr. Zavala personally wrote the district court
advising no attorney had communicated with him since receiving the December 2016 order
appointing counsel. R. 60. About four months later, on July 17, 2017, post-conviction counsel
did not appear for a status conference and the district court indicated it had been unsuccessful
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reaching counsel via email. R. 62-64 . Later that day, the district court “reviewed prior
proceedings for post-conviction counsel,” set the matter for review and ordered any amended
petition was to be filed before August 16, 2017. R. 63-65.
On August 25, 2017, a different attorney appeared on behalf of post-conviction counsel
and advised he was unaware of any amended petition and that Mr. Zavala had not been
transported. R. 72-73. The district court again extended the time to file the petition and set a
status conference. Id. On September 22, 2017, yet another attorney appeared for post-conviction
counsel and represented that post-conviction counsel was seeking leave to withdraw. R. 76. The
district court granted counsel’s request to withdraw and appointed a new attorney to represent
Mr. Zavala.
On October 25, 2017, the new attorney spent two hours traveling to the Owyhee County
courthouse and reviewing the file. R. 87. 1 On October 26, counsel spent four hours traveling for
and meeting with Mr. Zavala. On October 27, 2017, counsel advised the district court that he had
recently reviewed the case file and would file an amended petition. R. 82. On November 6, 2017,
post-conviction counsel spent two and a half hours traveling to the Owyhee County courthouse
and reviewing the post-conviction relief petition, supporting affidavit, the court minutes from the
jury trial and the state’s answer. R. 87. Between November 6 and 14, counsel spent an hour and a
half outlining, drafting and revising a notice, which reads in it entirety:
COMES NOW the Petitioner, MIGUEL Z. ZAVALA, by and through [counsel], and
hereby gives notice of his non-intention to file a First Amended Petition for Post
Post-conviction counsel’s detailed billing statements were attached to affidavits in support of
motions to pay his fees and filed in the court file rather than submitted ex parte and under seal.
1
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Conviction Relief and states that Petitioner intends to move forward on the Petition for
Post Conviction Relief (the "Petition") and Affidavit (the “Affidavit”) filed
contemporaneously therewith on December 12, 2016. Respondent simply requests that
the Court consider all documentation filed in support of his Petition including , the
Petition , the Affidavit and all papers attached to his Affidavit consisting of handwritten
allegations numbered paragraphs l through 34.
R. 83, 87-88. On November 13, 2017, post-conviction counsel reviewed an email from Mr.
Zavala requesting the “complete transcript from trial” and drafted a letter to appellate counsel
requesting a copy of a letter advising Mr. Zavala that appellate counsel would only challenge his
sentence. R. 88, 156. Counsel filed the notice to rely on the hand-written petition the following
day and his billing statements do not reflect he ever obtained or reviewed the trial transcript. R.
87-88.
On January 22, 2018, the district court issued notice of intent to dismiss. R. 92-99. The
district court found that the aggravated battery charge was a lesser included offense of the
attempted first degree murder charge and that the prosecutorial misconduct claim should have
been raised on appeal. The district court judicially noticed Information; court minutes from the
second day of trial; the Jury Instructions and an Amended Notice of Appeal. R. 101. The state did
not submit, and the district court did not consider, the transcripts prepared in Mr. Zavala’s direct
appeal. Post-conviction counsel responded to the district court’s notice with a copy of letter he
had sent to appellate counsel requesting a copy of a letter advising Mr. Zavala that appellate
counsel would only challenge his sentence. R. 153-156. The district court summarily dismissed
Mr. Zavala’s petition and entered judgment for the state. R. 170-73. This appeal follows.
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III. ISSUES PRESENTED ON APPEAL
1. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition for postconviction relief because he established issues of fact as to whether ineffective assistance of
counsel and prosecutorial misconduct rendered his conviction unconstitutional?
2. Did the district court err in summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition for postconviction relief because the district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the aggravated
battery charge?
3. Did the district court err in sua sponte dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition pursuant to I.C.
§ 19–4906 without considering the transcripts prepared in the underlying direct appeal?

IV. ARGUMENT
A petition for post-conviction relief initiates a civil proceeding in which the petitioner
must prove the allegations in his petition by a preponderance of evidence. I.C. § 19–4907;
Rhoades v. State, 148 Idaho 247, 249, 220 P.3d 1066, 1068 (2009); Keserovic v. State, 158 Idaho
234, 238, 345 P.3d 1024, 1028 (Ct. App. 2015). A petition for post-conviction relief must be
verified with respect to facts within the petitioner’s personal knowledge, and affidavits, records,
or other evidence supporting the petition’s allegations should be attached to the petition I.C. §
19-4903; see also Ash v. State, 162 Idaho 535, 537, 400 P.3d 623, 625 (Ct. App. 2017). However,
Section 19-4903 does not require “the petitioner to obtain the records from his underlying
criminal case as a prerequisite to filing a petition.” Sayas v. State, 139 Idaho 957, 960, 88 P.3d
776, 779 (Ct. App. 2003). Rather, I.C. § 19–4906(a) places that burden on the state.
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Saykhamchone v. State, 127 Idaho 319, 323, 900 P.2d 795, 799 (1995); Sayas, 139 Idaho at 960,
88 P.3d at 779. Idaho Code § 19-4906 authorizes the district court to sua sponte summarily
dismiss a petition for post-conviction relief, if the the answer or motion and record establish that
there is no genuine issue of material fact. See also Ash, 162 Idaho at 538, 400 P.3d at 626.
Here, the district court erroneously determined that the aggravated battery charge could
be charged as a lesser included offense and erred by summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s claim
that counsel was ineffective for allowing the district court to instruct the jury on that charge.
Moreover, because the jury acquitted Mr. Zavala of attempted first degree murder and he was
never charged with aggravated battery, the district court was without subject matter jurisdiction
to sentence him for aggravated battery. Moreover, the district court erred in dismissing Mr.
Zavala’s prosecutorial misconduct claim as one that should have been raised on direct appeal
because trial counsel did not object to any prosecutorial misconduct and the claim required
factual development. Finally, the district court erred in sua sponte dismissing Mr. Zavala’s
petition without reviewing the portions of the underlying criminal record that were material to
the post-conviction claims as required by I.C. § 19-4906. Accordingly, this Court should reverse
the district court’s judgment and remand for further proceedings.
A.

The District Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Zavala’s Post-Conviction Relief
Petition Because Aggravated Battery Was Not a Lesser Included Offense of the
Attempted First Degree Murder Charge Alleged in the Information
The Sixth Amendment to the United States Constitution guarantee criminal defendants

the right to the effective assistance of counsel. Murray v. State, 156 Idaho 159, 164, 321 P.3d
709, 714 (2014). Ineffective assistance of counsel claims require the post-conviction petition to
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prove: (1) the attorney performed deficiently and (2) the deficiency prejudiced the defendant.
Strickland v. Washington, 466 U.S. 668, 687–88 (1984); Wurdemann v. State, 161 Idaho 713,
717, 390 P.3d 439, 443 (2017).
A post-conviction petitioner establishes his attorney's performance was deficient by
proving his attorney's representation fell below an objective standard of reasonableness.
Strickland, 466 U.S. at 688; Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443. Counsel’s strategic
and tactical decisions can justify relief when the petitioner shows the decisions resulted from
inadequate preparation, ignorance of the relevant law or other shortcomings capable of objective
review. Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at 443; McKay v. State, 148 Idaho 567, 570, 225
P.3d 700, 703 (2010). Ultimately, “the standard for evaluating attorney performance is objective
reasonableness under prevailing professional norms.” Wurdemann, 161 Idaho at 717, 390 P.3d at
443; State v. Mathews, 133 Idaho 300, 306, 986 P.2d 323, 329 (1999). Under the second prong,
the defendant must show a reasonable probability that the outcome of trial would be different but
for counsel's deficient performance. McKay, 148 Idaho at 570, 225 P.3d at 703; State v. Row, 131
Idaho 303, 312, 955 P.2d 1082, 1091 (1998). A reasonable probability is a probability sufficient
to undermine confidence in the outcome. Strickland, 466 U.S. at 694; McKay, 148 Idaho at 570,
225 P.3d at 703.
Here, Mr. Zavala alleged his attorney provided ineffective assistance of counsel by
allowing the jury to find him guilty of aggravated battery where the offense was not a lesser
included offense of attempted first degree murder. The district court gave notice that it intended
to dismiss this claim because “the criminal information plainly alleges facts that meet the
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elements of aggravated battery” and the “jury was properly instructed on the lesser included
offense of aggravated battery.” R. 96.
However, the information accused Mr. Zavala of attempting to kill Mr. Zaragoza “by
attempting to run [him] over with an automobile and/or by attempting to stab or slice him with a
knife.” Conversely, as alleged here,2 aggravated battery involves great bodily harm, permanent
disfigurement or permanent disability caused by: (1) the willful or unlawful use of force or
violence; (2) an actual, intentional, and unlawful touching or striking; or (3) unlawfully and
intentionally causing bodily harm to another person. I.C. §§ 18-903, 18-907; R. 120-22/126-128.
The Information is devoid of any accusation that Mr. Zavala actually touched Mr.
Zaragoza, let alone caused injury satisfying the definition of aggravated battery. Rather than
“plainly meeting” aggravated battery’s elements as found by the district court, the information
alleges, at best, attempted simple battery.
Remarkably, the district court’s notice did not mention Sherrod, which Mr. Zavala cited
in the affidavit in support of his petition. There, the defendant was charged with aggravated
battery and the state filed an amended information limiting the injury alleged to constitute “great
bodily harm or permanent disfigurement” to stabbing in the back. Sherrod, 131 Idaho at 58, 951
P.2d at 1285. The Court concluded the jury instruction, which allowed the jury to find great
bodily harm based on injuries other than stab wounds, allowed the jury to find the defendant

The district court’s notice of intent to dismiss indicates that battery may be aggravated when it
is accomplished with a deadly weapon. R. 96. Here, however, the jury was only instructed
regarding great bodily harm, permanent disfigurement or permanent disability. R. 126-129.
2
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guilty of a crime other than which he was charged and required reversal. Id. at 59, 951 P.2d at
1286.
Here, the Information did not accuse Mr. Zavala of actually running over or stabbing Mr.
Zaragoza and did not accuse Mr. Zavala of causing any injury, let alone great bodily harm or
permanent disfigurement or disability. Further, the jury was required to acquit Mr. Zavala of
attempted first degree murder before even considering aggravated battery. These facts raise an
issue of material fact as to whether trial counsel competently allowed the jury to convict Mr.
Zavala of a crime with which he was not charged and raises a reasonable probability the result
would have been different had the jury not been instructed on aggravated battery.
Nor can this Court properly affirm on a basis other than the district court’s conclusion
that aggravated battery was a lesser included offense of the attempted first degree murder charge.
Mr. Zavala is entitled to adequate notice of the grounds on which the petition is to be dismissed
so as to afford a meaningful opportunity to respond. Takhsilov v. State, 161 Idaho 669, 673, 389
P.3d 955, 959 (2016); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 601, 200 P.3d 1148, 1150 (2009). The
district court based its dismissal of Mr. Zavala’s claim regarding trial counsel’s conduct on its
erroneous conclusion the offense was a lesser included offense. No motion for summary
dismissal was before the district court. Accordingly, this Court must vacate the judgment
dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition and remand for further proceedings.
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B.

Mr. Zavala is Entitled to Post-Conviction Relief Because the District Court Lacked
Subject-Matter Jurisdiction Over the Aggravated Battery Charge
This Court freely reviews jurisdictional questions and, because parties cannot waive

subject matter jurisdiction, a challenge to its existence may be raised at any time. State v.
McIntosh, 160 Idaho 1, 6, 368 P.3d 621, 626 (2016); State v. Rogers, 140 Idaho 223, 227, 91 P.3d
1127, 1131 (2004). Article I, section 8, of the Idaho Constitution provides, “No person shall be
held to answer for any felony ... unless on presentment or indictment of a grand jury or on
information of the public prosecutor, after a commitment by a magistrate....” See also Flegel, 151
Idaho at 526, 261 P.3d at 520. When the state files an “information, indictment, or complaint
alleging an offense was committed in the State of Idaho,” the charging document provides the
district court subject matter jurisdiction in a criminal case. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 6, 368 P.3d at
626. “An information or indictment cannot be amended so as to charge an offense other than that
for which the defendant has been held to answer.” I.C. § 19-1420.
Generally, subject matter jurisdiction continues until extinguished by some event and
does not depend on the correctness of the district court’s decisions. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 6,
368 P.3d at 626; Rogers, 140 Idaho at 228, 91 P.3d at 113. Thus, where the district court
erroneously determines an offense is a lesser included of the one charged, the jury instruction
error does not remove the trial court’s subject matter jurisdiction. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 6, 368
P.3d at 626. On the other hand, where an indictment is amended to charge an offense never
presented to the grand jury, the amended indictment the district court does not acquire subject
matter jurisdiction over the amended charge. Flegel, 151 Idaho at 531, 261 P.3d at 525.
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As discussed above, aggravated battery was not a lesser included offense of attempted
first degree murder as charged in the Information and the district court erred in requiring the jury
to determine whether Mr. Zavala committed aggravated battery. Under McIntosh, this
instructional error did not deprive the district court of subject matter jurisdiction. Nevertheless,
when the jury acquitted Mr. Zavala of attempted first-degree murder, the jurisdiction conferred
by the Information extinguished and no charging instrument accused Mr. Zavala of aggravated
battery. Accordingly, the district court had no jurisdiction to sentence Mr. Zavala for aggravated
battery and his conviction must be vacated.
Nor does this Court’s decision in McIntosh require a different result. There, the defendant
argued that the court lost subject matter jurisdiction when the district court dismissed the drug
trafficking count and gave an erroneous lesser-included instruction on possession of a controlled
substance with intent to deliver. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 7, 368 P.3d at 627. The Court
distinguished its decision in Flegel, noting the validity of the indictment was not at issue and the
defendant instead asserted the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction by giving an
erroneous lesser-included instruction on possession with intent to deliver. The instructional error
had no impact on the court’s jurisdiction because subject matter jurisdiction is not dependent on
the correctness of the trial court’s actions throughout the case. McIntosh, 160 Idaho at 7, 368 P.3d
at 627. Likewise, in this case, the district court did not lose jurisdiction when it erroneously
instructed the jury on aggravated battery.
Instead, the district court lost subject matter jurisdiction when the jury acquitted Mr.
Zavala of the only offense charged in the Information and no properly filed charging document
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ever conferred jurisdiction over the entirely distinct charge of aggravated battery. The state
alleged that Mr. Zavala committed attempted first degree murder because, with premeditation
and malice aforethought, he willfully, unlawfully and deliberately attempted to kill Mr. Zarazoga
by attempting to run him over or attempting to slash or stab him with a knife. R. 96-97/102-03.
Unlike McIntosh, the district court did not dismiss the attempted murder charge and allow the
jury to continue only the lesser, uncharged offense. Instead, here, the jury determined the only
offense charged in the Information in Mr. Zavala’s favor. The elements of aggravated battery
were not alleged in the Information and no charging document provided jurisdiction over the
aggravated battery charge.
The jury acquitted Mr. Zavala of the only offense charged in the Information. The
accusations set forth in the Information did not meet the elements of aggravated battery and no
charging document provided the district court with jurisdiction to sentence Mr. Zavala for that
offense. The district court lacked subject matter jurisdiction over the aggravated battery charge
and Mr. Zavala’s judgment must be vacated.
C.

The District Court Erred in Summarily Dismissing Mr. Zavala’s Petition Because
His Prosecutorial Misconduct Claim Could Not Be Raised on Direct Appeal
The district court notified Mr. Zavala of its intent to dismiss the prosecutorial misconduct

claim, finding the issue “could have or should have been raised on direct appeal” and that Mr.
Zavala had not shown that the claim raised a substantial doubt about the verdict’s reliability and
could not have been presented earlier in the exercise of due diligence. R. 98-99. In response, Mr.
Zavala alleged that appellate counsel authored a letter indicating he would not raise any issues on

!13

appeal other than the sentence and attached a letter asking appellate counsel to forward a copy of
such correspondence. R. 153-156. The district court dismissed the prosecutorial misconduct
claim, finding the letter did not make the requisite showing justifying why the claim was nor
raised on direct appeal.
However, un-objected to prosecutorial misconduct that does not meet the fundamental
error test enunciated in State v. Perry, 150 Idaho 209, 228, 245 P.3d 961, 980 (2010) is not an
issue that can be raised on direct appeal. The district court erred in summarily dismissing the
prosecutorial misconduct claim based on I.C. § 19-4901(b) and the case must be remanded.
Post-conviction relief is not a substitute for an appeal from the sentence or conviction and
any “issue which could have been raised on direct appeal, but was not, is forfeited and may not
be considered in post-conviction proceedings.” I.C. § 19-4901(b). This statute’s plain language
allows all constitutional claims, not only constitutional claims of ineffective assistance of
counsel, to be raised in post-conviction unless the claim could have been raised on appeal. Prior
to Perry, showing fundamental error focused on demonstrating the constitutional nature of the
violation. See State v. Anderson, 144 Idaho 743, 749, 170 P.3d 886, 892 (2007) (fundamental
error is a due process violation that produced manifest injustice).
However, Perry added a new requirement, that the error “plainly exists (without the need
for any additional information not contained in the appellate record, including information as to
whether the failure to object was a tactical decision).” Perry, 150 Idaho at 228, 245 P.3d at 980.
Constitutional errors which are not reviewable in direct appeal under Perry, remain reviewable
as direct constitutional violations under the plain language and intent of the UPCPA. Indeed, the
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Idaho Supreme Court and the Court of Appeals have long interpreted I.C. § 19-4901 to not only
allow direct constitutional claims in post-conviction but encouraged that they be raised in that
forum. See State v. Wegner, 148 Idaho 270, 220 P.3d 1089 (2009) (challenge to jurisdiction of
adult court should be raised in a post-conviction petition, not in a motion to withdraw the guilty
plea); DeRushé v. State, 146 Idaho 599, 200 P.3d 1148 (2008) (district court should have
analyzed claim as a denial of the constitutional right to testify rather than as a claim of
ineffective assistance of counsel); Berg v. State, 131 Idaho 517, 960 P.2d 738 (1998) (direct
constitutional claim of violation of plea agreement decided in post-conviction); Odiaga v. State,
130 Idaho 915, 950 P.2d (1997) (direct challenge to validity of guilty plea may be raised in postconviction); Owen v. State, 130 Idaho 715, 947 P.2d 388 (1997) (direct constitutional claim of
denial of due process leading to decision to relinquish jurisdiction decided in post-conviction);
Peltier v. State, 119 Idaho 454, 808 P.2d 373 (1989) (direct due process claims regarding
probation violation hearing properly raised in post-conviction); see also Mendiola v. State, 150
Idaho 345, 349, 247 P.3d 210, 214 (Ct. App. 2010) (petitioner not barred from raising claims
challenging guilty plea’s validity in post-conviction relief proceedings where no motion to
withdraw the plea was filed and testimony at post-conviction evidentiary hearing provided
information that was not presented to the district court); Mata v. State, 124 Idaho 588, 593–94,
861 P.2d 1253, 1258–59 (Ct. App. 1993) (petitioner raised constitutional challenge to validity of
guilty plea, which may be asserted through a post-conviction relief application); State v. Darbin,
109 Idaho 516, 523, 708 P.2d 921, 928 (Ct. App. 1985) (claim of deprivation of his right to
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testify in his own behalf should be raised through a petition for post -conviction relief if he
desires to pursue it).
In Grove v. State, 161 Idaho 840, 392 P.3d 18 (Ct. App. 2017), the Court of Appeals “held
that the potential remedy for post-conviction claims grounded on counsel’ alleged failings falls
within ineffective assistance of counsel, not direct constitutional violation and that “that an
alleged direct constitutional violation claim that has not been shown could not have been
presented on direct appeal is subject to I.C. § 19-4901(b)’s bar.” Ash, 162 Idaho at 540, 400 P.3d
at 628. To the extent Grove requires a petitioner to make a substantial showing explaining a
claim’s absence from direct appeal where the claim, as alleged, is one best suited for postconviction relief, it is wrongly decided and must be overturned.
Theoretically, claims of ineffective assistance of counsel could be raised in direct appeal.
See State v. Saxton, 133 Idaho 546, 549, 989 P.2d 288, 291 (Ct. App. 1999) (declining to address
ineffective assistance of counsel claim on direct appeal because if an appellate court were to
reach the merits of the claim, the absence of any factual record would generally require an
adverse decision to the appellant, which would become res judicata). Nonetheless, it is wellestablished that ineffective assistance of counsel is properly raised in post-conviction relief.
Petitioners raising ineffective assistance of counsel claims are not required to make the
“substantial showing” outlined in § 19-4901(b) despite being a claim being technically possible
to raise on direct appeal.
Un-objected to constitutional violations which do not meet the fundamental error test are
no different. Just as petitioners raising claims of ineffective assistance of counsel in post-
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conviction relief are not required to affirmatively explain why the claim was not raised on direct
appeal, petitioners raising direct constitutional claims that by their nature require factual
development.
Under the Grove analysis as interpreted by the district court, a defendant has no remedy
to correct a constitutional claim (other than ineffective assistance of counsel) that requires
development of the factual record. The district court’s reading of Grove incorrectly equates the
ability to litigate counsel’s ineffective assistance for failing to object to a constitutional error as
an adequate substitute for developing a record for a direct constitutional claim. This reasoning
ignores the category of constitutional violations that could be established by developing the
record but that do not meet the extremely deferential standard for ineffective assistance of
counsel. To the extent Grove controls the outcome in this case, it should be overruled.
Mr. Zavala alleged that the prosecutor engaged in misconduct by knowingly presenting
false evidence. Mr. Zavala also alleged that the prosecutor’s decision to not charge Mr. Zarazoga
with aggravated battery for the April 2015 incident was motivated by his desire to prevent Mr.
Zavala from presenting evidence of that incident to establish Mr. Zarazoga’s violent character.
The alleged misconduct was not objected to during trial proceedings. These allegations are not
reviewable under the fundamental error doctrine articulated in Perry and raising them on direct
appeal without a factual record would require an averse ruling that would become res judicata.
The district court erred in dismissing Mr. Zavala’s prosecutorial misconduct claim based on its
conclusion that the claim could have been raised on direct appeal.
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D.

The District Court Erred In Sua Sponte Dismissing Mr. Zavala’s Petition For PostConviction Relief Without Considering the Transcripts From the Underlying
Criminal Case
Pursuant to Idaho Code § 19-4906(a), the state must respond to the post-conviction

petition “by answer or by motion” and, if the record of the challenged proceedings is not
attached to petition, the state must file the portions of the record “that are material to the
questions raised in the application.” This Section imposes the responsibility to pay for and
produce the transcripts on the state. See Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 323, 900 P.2d at 799;
Roman v. State, 125 Idaho 644, 648, 873 P.2d 898, 902 (Ct. App. 1994). When “a court is
satisfied, on the basis of the application, the answer or motion, and the record, that the applicant
is not entitled to post-conviction relief and no purpose would be served by any further
proceedings, it may indicate to the parties its intention to dismiss the application and its reasons
for so doing.” I.C. § 19-4906(b) (emphasis added). “Courts reviewing applications for postconviction relief should have pertinent portions of the trial record ready for review” and “if the
petitioner fails to submit an adequate record, the state must do so.” Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at
323, 900 P.2d at 799.
Here, the state attached no records or transcripts to its answer and instead claimed Mr.
Zavala’s petition was subject to summary dismissal because he failed to provide “appropriate
affidavits, trial transcripts, records and other evidence” as required by I.C. §19-4903. R. 49-52.
Similarly, the district court dismissed Mr. Zavala’s petition, in part, because he did not supply
sufficient facts to establish his claims.
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However, Section 19-4903 does not require “the petitioner to obtain the records from his
underlying criminal case as a prerequisite to filing a petition.” Sayas, 139 Idaho at 960, 88 P.3d
at 779. Rather, I.C. § 19–4906(a) places the burden on the state to file the portions of the record
that are material to the questions raised in the application. Saykhamchone, 127 Idaho at 323, 900
P.2d at 799; Sayas, 139 Idaho at 960, 88 P.3d at 779. In requiring the state to produce records that
are “material” to the questions raised in the petition — as opposed to just those records helpful to
the state’s position — Section 19-4906(a) recognizes the record of the challenged proceeding is
necessary to proper consideration of many claims and that the state is in the best position to
supply those records. See also Ferguson v. Culliver, 527 F.3d 1144, 1149 (11th Cir. 2008)
(absence of the trial record in fact-intensive inquiry precluded the district court from conducting
a meaningful review of the state court decision, even under AEDPA’s deferential standard); Ruff
v. Kincheloe, 843 F.2d 1240, 1242 (9th Cir. 1988) (district court obliged to sua sponte obtain and
examine state court exhibits under 28 U.S.C.A. § 2254(f) when the habeas petitioner is unable to
produce the record based on indigency or other reason).
The claims raised in Mr. Zavala’s petition concerned the state’s conduct in a motion in
limine hearing, trial counsel’s conduct at trial and instructional error. These claims require the
transcript to meaningfully evaluate and support. The district court erred in dismissing Mr.
Zavala’s petition without requiring the state to produce records and transcripts from the
underlying criminal proceeding that were material to Mr. Zavala’s claims or noticing those
transcripts on its own accord.
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Nor does Rome v. State, 164 Idaho 407, 431 P.3d 242, 251 (2018) dictate a different
result. There, the Court addressed whether the district court abused its discretion in denying the
petitioner’s overly broad requests that the district court judicially notice the file and transcript.
Rome, 164 Idaho at 414, 431 P.3d at 249. The Court noted that the petitioner “was better
positioned to direct the district court toward specific documents or to otherwise tailor his
requests toward relevant information” and a request for judicial notice should “saddle the court
with an inefficient and onerous obligation to scour the records of underlying or separate cases in
an aimless search for information that might be potentially relevant.” Id. The Court further noted
that to “do so would make that judge an advocate of the moving party as the judge would be
gleaning facts for one party or another.” Id. Therefore, this Court found no abuse of discretion in
the district court’s decision on the petitioner’s request for judicial notice. Id. at 416, 431 P.3d at
251; see also DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 603, 200 P.3d at 1152 (district court did not err in failing to
take judicial notice of petitioner’s underlying criminal case).
Here, post-conviction counsel did not file a request for judicial notice and the district
court’s ruling on such a request is not before this Court. Instead, the district court failed to
comply with I.C. § 19-4906(b) when it sua sponte dismissed Mr. Zavala’s petition without either
ordering the state to comply with its obligation to produce the transcripts under Section
19-4906(a) or sua sponte judicially noticing the portions of the record that were material to Mr.
Zavala’s claims. Neither DeRushé nor Rome addressed the district court and state’s statutory
obligations concerning the record pursuant to Section 19-4906.
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Nor is post-conviction counsel’s failure to request the transcript fatal to Mr. Zavala’s
appellate claim. Idaho has previously distinguished between district court errors in failing to
comply with post-conviction statutory procedures and post-conviction counsel’s failure to object.
For instance, in DeRushé the Court held that an appellant may not challenge the sufficiency of
the notice contained in the state's motion for summary disposition for the first time on appeal.
146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. The Court noted its decision in Saykhamchone allowed
petitioners to challenge the the district court’s error in dismissing without sufficient notice
notwithstanding no objection below and that the sufficiency of the state’s motion did not
challenge any action by the trial court. DeRushe, 146 Idaho at 602, 200 P.3d at 1151. Here, the
district court erred by sua sponte dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition without adhering to the
procedures outlined in Section 19-4906.
Further, the concern expressed in Rome — that identifying relevant portions of the record
would place the judge in an advocate role — does not apply in circumstances such as the ones at
bar. Here, counsel not only failed to request judicial notice of any portion of the underlying
criminal record or transcripts, he did not review any transcripts before filing notice he would not
amend Mr. Zavala’s petition. R. 165-167. Indeed, according to his billing, post-conviction
counsel spent a total of four and a half hours, which included travel for two trips from Homedale
to the Owyhee County Courthouse, reviewing the post-conviction relief petition, supporting
affidavit, the court minutes from the jury trial and the state’s answer. Mr. Zavala personally
requested the complete trial transcript on November 13. R. 166. Yet the following day, instead of
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reviewing the transcript, counsel notified the district court he would not amend the petition and
would proceed on his clients hand-written document. R. 83, 166.
Failing to address the district court’s error because of post-conviction counsel did not
object would further erode this Court’s supervisory authority over the trial courts determination
of constitutional rights in favor of those claims being considered de novo in federal court. Under
Murphy v. State, 156 Idaho 389, 395, 327 P.3d 365, 371 (2014), this Court already relinquished
its opportunity adjudicate claims of ineffective assistance of trial counsel and direct appeal
counsel claims that were not properly raised due to ineffective assistance of post-conviction
counsel during the first post-conviction action. See Johnson v. State, 162 Idaho 213, 228, 395 P.
3d 1246, 1261 (2017), citing Johnson v. Kirkman, No. 4:14-CV-00395-CWD, 2014 WL
7186842, at *2 (D. Idaho Dec. 16, 2014). Despite the federal court’s expressed reluctance to
assume de novo review of Idaho criminal law “out of comity and deference to the state's strong
interest in its own criminal cases,” this Court found the underlying policy in Murphy had not
changed in the two years since it was decided. Id.
Cases such as this one illustrate the danger of carrying Murphy too far. In barring
successive post-conviction petitions based on ineffective assistance of counsel of post-conviction
relief counsel, the Court noted defendants had made a sham out of the system with continuous
petitions for relief that often present claims without a legal foundation. Murphy, 156 Idaho at
395, 327 P.3d at 371. However, justifying the meaningless processing of post-conviction claims
by the nominal appointment of counsel similarly renders the procedural protections in the UCPA
no more than a pretense in protecting the constitutional rights of the accused.
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Here, Mr. Zavala filed a pro se, hand-written petition describing various constitutional
violations that occurred during his trial. After his first attorney took no action for almost a year,
his second attorney quickly stood on the hand-written petition without even bothering to look at
the trial transcript. The district court then dismissed Mr. Zavala’s petition without holding the
state to its statutory obligation to produce the transcript or reviewing it on its own accord.
Particularly in light of Murphy’s restrictive interpretation of I.C. § 19-4908, this Court must
require district court to follow its statutory obligations under the the UCPA.
The district court could not properly sua sponte dismiss under Section 19-4906(b) until it
had considered the portions of record that material were material to resolution of the claims
raised in Mr. Zavala’s petition. The transcript prepared in Mr. Zavala’s direct appeal was patently
material to each of Mr. Zavala’s claims and was part of the record the district court was required
to consider before sua sponte dismissing the petition. Accordingly, the district court erred in
summarily dismissing Mr. Zavala’s petition for post-conviction relief and this case must be
remanded for further proceedings.
IV. CONCLUSION
For all the reasons stated above, Mr. Zavala asks this Court to reverse the judgment for
the state and remand for further proceedings.
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